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On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis

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  • Chung, T.Y.

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  • Chung, T.Y., 1991. "On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9102, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9102
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    Cited by:

    1. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
    2. Eberhard Feess & Michael Gerfin & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2015. "Contracts As Rent-Seeking Devices: Evidence From German Soccer," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 714-730, January.
    3. Jihong Lee, 2005. "Incomplete Information, Renegotiation, and Breach of Contract," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(5), pages 1-7.
    4. Liu, Zhiyong & Avraham, Ronen, 2012. "Ex ante versus ex post expectation damages," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 339-355.
    5. Hori, Kazumi, 2008. "The role of private benefits in information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 626-631, December.
    6. Hatzis, Aristides N., 2002. "Having the cake and eating it too: efficient penalty clauses in Common and Civil contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 381-406, December.
    7. MacKenzie, Ian A. & Ohndorf, Markus, 2013. "Restricted Coasean bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 296-307.
    8. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta & Thomas Rønde, 2009. "Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion," Working Papers 2009.120, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:5:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Michele Moretto & Gianpaolo Rossini, 1996. "Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 339-368, December.
    11. David Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2007. "Exclusive contracts foster relationship-specific investment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 85-97, March.
    12. Ottorino Chillemi & Claudio Mezzetti, 2014. "Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 335-355, February.
    13. Comino, Stefano & Nicolò, Antonio & Tedeschi, Piero, 2010. "Termination clauses in partnerships," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 718-732, July.
    14. Edwin Leuven & Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Chris van Klaveren, 2005. "Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(285), pages 137-149, February.
    15. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June.
    16. Bond, Philip & Newman, Andrew F., 2009. "Prohibitions on punishments in private contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 526-540, October.
    17. Jorge Montesinos & Eduardo Saavedra, 2012. "Algunos Alcances en torno a la Institucionalidad y Renegociación de Concesiones en la Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público en Perú," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv277, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
    18. Ronen Avraham & Zhiyong Liu, 2006. "Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 523-561.
    19. Fan Zhang, 2008. "Dynamic Contract Breach," EAG Discussions Papers 200803, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    20. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15024, October.
    21. Seshimo, Hiroyuki, 2003. "Optimal tenant protection," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 59-92, January.
    22. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 1999. "Golden Cages for Showy Birds: Optimal Switching Costs in Labour Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2006. "Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 2367, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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    Keywords

    contracts ; competition ; economic models;

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