Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
This paper considers a general version of the hold-up problem where n agents first make relation-specific investments and then must agree on some collective action. It is shown that first-best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries.
Volume (Year): 59 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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