The Legality of Vertical Restraints by the Rule of Reason and the Character of the Specific Investments
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More about this item
Keywordscooperative relation-specific investments; vertical restraints; antitrust; rule of reason; e-commerce;
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
- E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- K - Law and Economics
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