Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts
When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- d’ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET , Louis-André, 1996. "Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge," CORE Discussion Papers 1996012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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