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Patrick W. Schmitz

Personal Details

First Name:Patrick
Middle Name:W.
Last Name:Schmitz
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psc133
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz
University of Cologne, Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany
Terminal Degree:1999 Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereich; Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Universität zu Köln

Köln, Germany
http://www.wiso.uni-koeln.de/
RePEc:edi:wskoede (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2025. "Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 20699, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2024. "When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods?," CEPR Discussion Papers 19177, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 18048, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?," CEPR Discussion Papers 17885, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 18208, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 16003, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 15970, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra, 2020. "Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 15492, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2020. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," CEPR Discussion Papers 15567, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 15514, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 13881, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 13841, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  14. Schmitz, Patrick W. & ,, 2018. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers 13406, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  15. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2018. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 13204, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  16. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory," MPRA Paper 95618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 12174, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  19. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 11276, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  20. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  21. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström [Contract Theory: On the Contributions of the 2016 Nobel Laureates Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström]," MPRA Paper 75233, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2016. "The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11215, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  23. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 11632, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  24. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2015. "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 11002, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  25. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  26. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," CEPR Discussion Papers 10249, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  27. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 10207, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  28. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 10110, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  29. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9396, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  30. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9281, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  31. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 9676, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  32. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 9287, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  33. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2013. "Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 9510, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  34. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," MPRA Paper 36914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  35. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9050, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  36. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 9141, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  37. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9065, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  38. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 8366, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  39. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2011. "The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule," MPRA Paper 32716, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  40. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  41. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8241, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  42. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7976, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  43. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva & Kusterer, David J, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8167, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  44. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," CEPR Discussion Papers 7681, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  45. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," Working Papers 0463, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  46. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases," Working Papers 0465, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  47. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7205, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  48. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 7331, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  49. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  50. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7252, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  51. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  52. Philipp C. Wichardt & Daniel Schunk & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2008. "Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining," IEW - Working Papers 398, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  53. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  54. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  55. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2007. "Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6467, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  56. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  57. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6207, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  58. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Roider, Andreas, 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 6476, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  59. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  60. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 5747, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  61. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2006. "Garbled Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5958, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  62. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)," MPRA Paper 6977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  63. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  64. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  65. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  66. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 25/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  67. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  68. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003)," MPRA Paper 6975, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  69. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4031, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  70. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," CEPR Discussion Papers 4264, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  71. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3774, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  72. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information," MPRA Paper 6934, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  73. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  74. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 12532, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  75. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  76. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  77. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  78. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances," CEPR Discussion Papers 2698, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  79. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  80. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  81. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2679, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  82. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," MPRA Paper 6929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  83. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  84. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  85. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick, 2000. "Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 19/2000, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  86. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 12534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  87. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6971, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  88. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998)," MPRA Paper 6972, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  89. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung," MPRA Paper 6945, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  90. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," MPRA Paper 12533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  91. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  92. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma," MPRA Paper 6936, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  93. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment," MPRA Paper 13448, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  94. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  95. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  96. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," MPRA Paper 6549, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  97. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem," MPRA Paper 6944, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  98. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?," MPRA Paper 6937, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  99. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1996. "Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    repec:cgr:cgsser:02-02 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2025. "Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 256(C).
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2024. "When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
  3. Petra Nieken & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2023. "Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 989-1021, November.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
  5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
  7. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
  8. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
  9. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2021. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(1), pages 238-266, January.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 100-112.
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  14. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 514-532.
  15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
  16. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 544-564.
  17. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 96-99.
  19. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
  20. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 706-725.
  21. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 88-92.
  22. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 33-37.
  23. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 92-107.
  24. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 23-31.
  25. Jörg Oechssler & Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2015. "Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 565-588, December.
  26. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 17-33.
  27. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 116-120.
  28. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
  29. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
  30. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 145-166.
  31. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
  32. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 533-536.
  33. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 28-31.
  34. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 336-339.
  35. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, March.
  36. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
  37. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(4), pages 1516-1544.
  38. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 841-843.
  39. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 642-645.
  40. Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 808-830, September.
  41. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
  42. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 651-665.
  43. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
  44. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
  45. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 258-268, April.
  46. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
  47. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 58-62, April.
  48. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 147-152, October.
  49. Wichardt, Philipp C. & Schunk, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 33-35, April.
  50. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December.
  51. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  52. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 577-580, June.
  53. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November.
  54. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
  55. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 208-214, December.
  56. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 637-653, April.
  57. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
  58. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
  59. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Book Review," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 535-542, September.
  60. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 727-738, December.
  61. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Endogenous Punishments In Agency With Verifiable Ex Post Information ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1207-1231, November.
  62. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
  63. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
  64. P. W. Schmitz, 2004. "Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 87-92, January.
  65. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 56(1), pages 72-89, January.
  66. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.
  67. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April.
  68. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On second-price auctions and imperfect competition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 901-909, November.
  69. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 177-189, September.
  70. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
  71. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  72. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2001. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
  73. Patrick Schmitz, 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 23-28, January.
  74. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
  75. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 2001. "On synergies and vertical integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1281-1295, September.
  76. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September.
  77. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
  78. R. Luce & M. Raith & E. Rasmusen & S. Grosskopf & K. Velupillai & W. Pauwels & E. Furubotn & P. Schmitz & S. Napel, 2000. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 316-342, October.
  79. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 181-185, May.
  80. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 1027-1027, September.
  81. Patrick W. Schmitz & Dirk Sliwka, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 15, pages 233-243.
  82. Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. "Randomization in Coalition Contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 341-353, March.
  83. Schmitz, Patrick W, 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 52(1), pages 89-101.

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Works
  3. Number of Distinct Works
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  7. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  8. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  9. Number of Citations
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  18. h-index
  19. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  20. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  21. Number of Journal Pages
  22. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  23. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  24. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  27. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  28. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  29. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  30. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  31. Record of graduates
  32. Breadth of citations across fields
  33. Wu-Index

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 84 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (46) 2008-04-12 2009-02-28 2009-02-28 2009-03-14 2009-04-25 2009-11-07 2009-12-19 2010-06-18 2011-02-12 2011-02-26 2011-04-02 2012-03-08 2012-07-23 2012-07-29 2012-07-29 2012-10-06 2012-10-13 2012-10-27 2013-01-12 2013-02-16 2013-03-16 2013-03-23 2013-04-13 2013-04-13 2013-04-13 2013-09-24 2014-06-02 2015-01-09 2016-01-03 2016-04-30 2016-05-21 2016-11-27 2017-07-30 2017-09-10 2018-11-26 2019-08-26 2019-08-26 2019-09-02 2020-01-20 2021-01-25 2021-03-22 2021-04-12 2021-05-10 2022-05-30 2023-07-24 2025-11-03. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (43) 2004-02-29 2004-02-29 2005-05-07 2005-10-29 2006-10-28 2006-12-09 2007-03-31 2007-09-30 2011-04-02 2011-08-15 2012-07-29 2013-01-12 2013-03-16 2013-03-23 2013-04-13 2013-04-13 2014-06-02 2015-07-11 2016-01-03 2016-05-21 2016-05-21 2016-11-27 2017-07-30 2017-09-10 2019-01-21 2019-01-21 2019-01-21 2019-03-04 2019-08-26 2019-08-26 2019-09-02 2020-01-20 2021-01-25 2021-03-22 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2022-05-30 2023-02-27 2023-05-15 2023-07-24 2024-07-29 2025-11-03. Author is listed
  3. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (19) 2007-09-30 2008-04-29 2008-05-31 2008-05-31 2008-11-25 2009-01-03 2009-03-14 2009-04-25 2011-02-12 2011-04-02 2012-07-29 2013-02-16 2013-04-13 2013-09-24 2016-01-03 2016-04-30 2018-11-26 2019-09-02 2021-05-17. Author is listed
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (13) 2006-01-29 2007-03-31 2015-01-09 2017-07-30 2019-08-26 2019-08-26 2019-09-02 2020-01-20 2021-04-12 2021-05-10 2022-05-30 2023-05-15 2023-07-24. Author is listed
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (10) 2007-09-30 2008-04-12 2008-05-31 2009-03-14 2009-04-25 2011-08-15 2013-03-16 2013-04-13 2013-09-24 2016-01-03. Author is listed
  6. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (7) 2005-05-07 2005-12-09 2014-12-24 2019-08-26 2021-03-22 2021-05-17 2022-05-30. Author is listed
  7. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (7) 2004-02-29 2006-12-09 2009-02-28 2011-02-12 2012-07-29 2012-10-06 2019-09-02. Author is listed
  8. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (7) 2008-04-12 2011-02-12 2011-02-26 2018-11-26 2019-03-04 2019-09-02 2025-11-03. Author is listed
  9. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (6) 2012-03-08 2012-07-29 2013-03-23 2016-01-03 2021-03-22 2021-05-17. Author is listed
  10. NEP-REG: Regulation (6) 2005-05-07 2017-09-10 2019-01-21 2021-05-17 2023-05-15 2023-07-24. Author is listed
  11. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (5) 2008-05-31 2008-05-31 2009-01-03 2011-04-02 2013-02-16. Author is listed
  12. NEP-INO: Innovation (5) 2007-03-31 2012-07-23 2012-10-27 2013-01-12 2016-04-30. Author is listed
  13. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (4) 2013-02-16 2016-11-27 2019-08-26 2020-01-20
  14. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (4) 2019-01-21 2021-01-25 2021-05-17 2021-05-17
  15. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2007-09-24 2011-02-26 2012-07-23
  16. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 2006-12-09 2007-05-12 2011-08-15
  17. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (3) 2006-12-09 2007-05-12 2011-08-15
  18. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (3) 2003-02-18 2012-10-06 2012-10-27
  19. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (2) 2016-05-21 2019-01-21
  20. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (2) 2008-05-31 2008-06-07
  21. NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (2) 2005-08-13 2006-01-29
  22. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2003-02-20 2014-06-02
  23. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy (2) 2013-01-12 2016-04-30
  24. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2023-05-15
  25. NEP-GER: German Papers (1) 2016-11-27
  26. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic and Financial History (1) 2016-11-27
  27. NEP-IPR: Intellectual Property Rights (1) 2012-07-23
  28. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2021-03-22
  29. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (1) 2005-05-07
  30. NEP-TRE: Transport Economics (1) 2019-03-04
  31. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2007-09-30
  32. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (1) 2019-03-04

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