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Patrick W. Schmitz

Personal Details

First Name:Patrick
Middle Name:W.
Last Name:Schmitz
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psc133
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz
University of Cologne, Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany
Terminal Degree:1999 Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereich; Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Universität zu Köln

Köln, Germany
http://www.wiso.uni-koeln.de/
RePEc:edi:wskoede (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 18048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?," CEPR Discussion Papers 17885, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 18208, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 16003, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 15970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra, 2020. "Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 15492, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2020. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," CEPR Discussion Papers 15567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 15514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 13881, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 13841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W. & ,, 2018. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers 13406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2018. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 13204, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory," MPRA Paper 95618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 12174, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 11276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström [Contract Theory: On the Contributions of the 2016 Nobel Laureates Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström]," MPRA Paper 75233, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2016. "The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 11632, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2015. "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 11002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  24. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," CEPR Discussion Papers 10249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 10207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 10110, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  28. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 9676, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 9287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  31. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2013. "Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 9510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," MPRA Paper 36914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  33. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  34. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 9141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  35. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9065, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  36. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 8366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  37. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2011. "The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule," MPRA Paper 32716, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  39. Eva I. Hoppe & David J. Kusterer & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2011. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 02-02, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
  40. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Nieken, Petra, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  41. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  42. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," CEPR Discussion Papers 7681, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  43. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," Working Papers 0463, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  44. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases," Working Papers 0465, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  45. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  46. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 7331, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  47. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  48. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  49. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  50. Philipp C. Wichardt & Daniel Schunk & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2008. "Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining," IEW - Working Papers 398, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  51. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  52. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  53. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2007. "Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  54. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  55. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  56. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Roider, Andreas, 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 6476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  57. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  58. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 5747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  59. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2006. "Garbled Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5958, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  60. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)," MPRA Paper 6977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  61. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  62. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  63. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  64. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 25/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  65. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  66. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003)," MPRA Paper 6975, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  67. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  68. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," CEPR Discussion Papers 4264, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  69. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  70. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information," MPRA Paper 6934, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  71. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  72. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 12532, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  73. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  74. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  75. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  76. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances," CEPR Discussion Papers 2698, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  77. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  78. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  79. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2679, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  80. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," MPRA Paper 6929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  81. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  82. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  83. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick, 2000. "Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 19/2000, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  84. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 12534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  85. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6971, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  86. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998)," MPRA Paper 6972, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  87. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung," MPRA Paper 6945, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  88. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," MPRA Paper 12533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  89. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  90. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma," MPRA Paper 6936, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  91. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment," MPRA Paper 13448, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  92. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  93. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  94. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," MPRA Paper 6549, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  95. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem," MPRA Paper 6944, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  96. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?," MPRA Paper 6937, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  97. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1996. "Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6947, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Petra Nieken & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2023. "Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 989-1021, November.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
  5. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
  6. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
  7. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2021. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(1), pages 238-266, January.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 100-112.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  12. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 514-532.
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
  14. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 544-564.
  15. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
  16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 96-99.
  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
  18. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 706-725.
  19. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 88-92.
  20. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 33-37.
  21. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 92-107.
  22. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 23-31.
  23. Jörg Oechssler & Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2015. "Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 565-588, December.
  24. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 17-33.
  25. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 116-120.
  26. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
  27. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
  28. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 145-166.
  29. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
  30. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 533-536.
  31. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 28-31.
  32. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 336-339.
  33. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, March.
  34. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
  35. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(4), pages 1516-1544.
  36. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 841-843.
  37. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 642-645.
  38. Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 808-830, September.
  39. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
  40. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 651-665.
  41. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
  42. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
  43. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 258-268, April.
  44. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
  45. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 58-62, April.
  46. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 147-152, October.
  47. Wichardt, Philipp C. & Schunk, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 33-35, April.
  48. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December.
  49. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  50. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 577-580, June.
  51. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November.
  52. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
  53. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 208-214, December.
  54. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 637-653, April.
  55. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
  56. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
  57. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Book Review," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 535-542, September.
  58. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 727-738, December.
  59. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Endogenous Punishments In Agency With Verifiable Ex Post Information ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1207-1231, November.
  60. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
  61. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
  62. P. W. Schmitz, 2004. "Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 87-92, January.
  63. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 56(1), pages 72-89, January.
  64. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.
  65. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April.
  66. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On second-price auctions and imperfect competition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 901-909, November.
  67. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 177-189, September.
  68. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
  69. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  70. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2001. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
  71. Patrick Schmitz, 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 23-28, January.
  72. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
  73. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 2001. "On synergies and vertical integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1281-1295, September.
  74. Schmitz, P. W., 2000. "Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382]," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 575-575, December.
  75. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September.
  76. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
  77. R. Luce & M. Raith & E. Rasmusen & S. Grosskopf & K. Velupillai & W. Pauwels & E. Furubotn & P. Schmitz & S. Napel, 2000. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 316-342, October.
  78. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 181-185, May.
  79. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 1027-1027, September.
  80. Patrick W. Schmitz & Dirk Sliwka, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 15, pages 233-243.
  81. Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. "Randomization in Coalition Contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 341-353, March.
  82. Schmitz, Patrick W, 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 52(1), pages 89-101.

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Works
  3. Number of Distinct Works
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  7. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  8. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  9. Number of Citations
  10. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  18. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  19. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  20. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  21. h-index
  22. Number of Journal Pages
  23. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  24. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  27. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  28. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  29. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  30. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  31. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  32. Breadth of citations across fields
  33. Wu-Index
  34. Record of graduates

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 82 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (45) 2008-04-12 2009-02-28 2009-02-28 2009-03-14 2009-04-25 2009-11-07 2009-12-19 2010-06-18 2011-02-12 2011-02-26 2011-04-02 2012-03-08 2012-07-23 2012-07-29 2012-07-29 2012-10-06 2012-10-13 2012-10-27 2013-01-12 2013-02-16 2013-03-16 2013-03-23 2013-04-13 2013-04-13 2013-04-13 2013-09-24 2014-06-02 2015-01-09 2016-01-03 2016-04-30 2016-05-21 2016-11-27 2017-07-30 2017-09-10 2018-11-26 2019-08-26 2019-08-26 2019-09-02 2020-01-20 2021-01-25 2021-03-22 2021-04-12 2021-05-10 2022-05-30 2023-07-24. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (41) 2004-02-29 2004-02-29 2005-05-07 2005-10-29 2006-10-28 2006-12-09 2007-03-31 2007-09-30 2011-04-02 2011-08-15 2012-07-29 2013-01-12 2013-03-16 2013-03-23 2013-04-13 2013-04-13 2014-06-02 2015-07-11 2016-01-03 2016-05-21 2016-05-21 2016-11-27 2017-07-30 2017-09-10 2019-01-21 2019-01-21 2019-01-21 2019-03-04 2019-08-26 2019-08-26 2019-09-02 2020-01-20 2021-01-25 2021-03-22 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2021-05-17 2022-05-30 2023-02-27 2023-05-15 2023-07-24. Author is listed
  3. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (19) 2007-09-30 2008-04-29 2008-05-31 2008-05-31 2008-11-25 2009-01-03 2009-03-14 2009-04-25 2011-02-12 2011-04-02 2012-07-29 2013-02-16 2013-04-13 2013-09-24 2016-01-03 2016-04-30 2018-11-26 2019-09-02 2021-05-17. Author is listed
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (13) 2006-01-29 2007-03-31 2015-01-09 2017-07-30 2019-08-26 2019-08-26 2019-09-02 2020-01-20 2021-04-12 2021-05-10 2022-05-30 2023-05-15 2023-07-24. Author is listed
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (10) 2007-09-30 2008-04-12 2008-05-31 2009-03-14 2009-04-25 2011-08-15 2013-03-16 2013-04-13 2013-09-24 2016-01-03. Author is listed
  6. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (7) 2005-05-07 2005-12-09 2014-12-24 2019-08-26 2021-03-22 2021-05-17 2022-05-30. Author is listed
  7. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (7) 2004-02-29 2006-12-09 2009-02-28 2011-02-12 2012-07-29 2012-10-06 2019-09-02. Author is listed
  8. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (6) 2012-03-08 2012-07-29 2013-03-23 2016-01-03 2021-03-22 2021-05-17. Author is listed
  9. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (6) 2008-04-12 2011-02-12 2011-02-26 2018-11-26 2019-03-04 2019-09-02. Author is listed
  10. NEP-REG: Regulation (6) 2005-05-07 2017-09-10 2019-01-21 2021-05-17 2023-05-15 2023-07-24. Author is listed
  11. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (5) 2008-05-31 2008-05-31 2009-01-03 2011-04-02 2013-02-16. Author is listed
  12. NEP-INO: Innovation (5) 2007-03-31 2012-07-23 2012-10-27 2013-01-12 2016-04-30. Author is listed
  13. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (4) 2013-02-16 2016-11-27 2019-08-26 2020-01-20
  14. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (4) 2019-01-21 2021-01-25 2021-05-17 2021-05-17
  15. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2007-09-24 2011-02-26 2012-07-23
  16. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 2006-12-09 2007-05-12 2011-08-15
  17. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (3) 2006-12-09 2007-05-12 2011-08-15
  18. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (3) 2003-02-18 2012-10-06 2012-10-27
  19. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (2) 2016-05-21 2019-01-21
  20. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (2) 2008-05-31 2008-06-07
  21. NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (2) 2005-08-13 2006-01-29
  22. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2003-02-20 2014-06-02
  23. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy (2) 2013-01-12 2016-04-30
  24. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2023-05-15
  25. NEP-GER: German Papers (1) 2016-11-27
  26. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic and Financial History (1) 2016-11-27
  27. NEP-IPR: Intellectual Property Rights (1) 2012-07-23
  28. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2021-03-22
  29. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (1) 2005-05-07
  30. NEP-TRE: Transport Economics (1) 2019-03-04
  31. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2007-09-30
  32. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (1) 2019-03-04

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