The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights
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- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," MPRA Paper 6929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
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- Illing, Gerhard, 1992. "Private Information as Transaction Costs: The Coase Theorem Revisited," Munich Reprints in Economics 19522, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Garrouste, Pierre, 2008. "The Handbook of New Institutional Economics, C. Ménard, M.M. Shirley (Eds.), Springer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. 2005, 884Â +Â xi pp., $199.00, index, ISBN: 10 1-4020-2687-0," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 532-536, August.
- Piacquadio Paolo G. & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Acocella Nicola, 2009. "A simple framework for investigating the properties of policy games," wp.comunite 0059, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- E. Guzzini & A. Palestrini, 2012.
"Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games,"
European Journal of Law and Economics,
Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 83-100, February.
- Guzzini Enrico & Palestrini Antonio, 2009. "Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games," wp.comunite 0060, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Nicolas Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2007.
"What to put in the table,"
Documentos de Trabajo
237, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "What to Put on the Table," Working Papers 08-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2007. "What to Put on the Table," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000374, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lau, M. W., 2011. "The Economic Structure of Trusts: Towards a Property-based Approach," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199602407.
- Madhav Aney, 2015. "Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 833-859, April.
More about this item
KeywordsProperty rights; bargaining; private information; Coase theorem;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
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