IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ter/wpaper/0060.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games

Author

Listed:
  • Guzzini Enrico
  • Palestrini Antonio

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the Coase theorem in a non cooperative game framework. In particular, we explore the robustness of the Coase theorem with respect to the ?nal distribution of alienable property rights which constitutes, as far as we know, a less cultivated ?eld of research. In our framework, in order to reach e¢ ciency, agents have to stipulate binding contracts. In the analysis, we distinguish between permanent and temporary contracts showing the di¤erent implication of the two kinds of contracts with respect to the ?nal attribution of individual rights. More precisely, we show that, with temporary binding contracts and under particular assumptions, the ?nal attribution if individual rights does not converge.

Suggested Citation

  • Guzzini Enrico & Palestrini Antonio, 2009. "Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games," wp.comunite 0060, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0060
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://wp.comunite.it/data/wp_no_60_2009.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sen, Amartya K, 1976. "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(171), pages 217-245, August.
    2. Sen, Amartya, 1992. "Minimal Liberty," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 139-159, May.
    3. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2006. "Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 223-245, January.
    4. Varouj Aivazian & Jeffrey Callen, 2003. "The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 287-299, December.
    5. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2001. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 377-411, March.
    6. Patrick Schmitz, 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 23-28, January.
    7. Gaertner, Wulf & Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Individual Rights Revisited," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 161-177, May.
    8. Bernholz, Peter, 1997. "Property rights, contracts, cyclical social preferences and the Coase theorem: A synthesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 419-442, September.
    9. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
    10. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
    11. Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(1), pages 109-128, July.
    12. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695, October.
    13. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, October.
    14. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April.
    15. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    16. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    17. Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80.
    18. Usher, Dan, 1998. "The Coase theorem is tautological, incoherent or wrong," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 3-11, October.
    19. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-185, March.
    20. Aivazian, Varouj A & Callen, Jeffrey L, 1981. "The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 175-181, April.
    21. Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
    22. Bernholz, Peter, 1999. "The generalized Coase Theorem and separable individual preferences: an extension," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 331-335, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coase theorem; binding contracts; side payments;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0060. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Giovanni Di Bartolomeo). General contact details of provider: http://wp.comunite.it/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.