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Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights

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  • Bezalel Peleg

    (Cornell University, Department of Economics, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA)

Abstract

In this paper we offer an axiomatic approach for the investigation of rights by means of game forms. We give a new definition of constitution which consists of three components: the set of rights, the assignment of rights to groups of members of the society, and the distribution of power in the society (as a function of the distribution of rights). Using the foregoing definition we investigate game forms that faithfully represent the distribution of power in the society, and allow the members of the society to exercise their rights simultaneously. Several well-known examples are analyzed in the light of our framework. Finally, we find a connection between Sen's minimal liberalism and Maskin's result on implementation by Nash equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:67-80 Note: Received: 25 November 1994/Accepted: 28 June 1996
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Piacquadio Paolo G. & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Acocella Nicola, 2009. "A simple framework for investigating the properties of policy games," wp.comunite 0059, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    2. Ngo Van Long & Vincent Martinet, 2012. "Combining Rights and Welfarism: A New Approach to Intertemporal Evaluation of Social Alternatives," CESifo Working Paper Series 3746, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Ben McQuillin & Robert Sugden, 2011. "The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: games in transition function form," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 683-706, October.
    4. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans, 2009. "Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 503-515, March.
    5. Bezalel Peleg & Ariel Procaccia, 2010. "Implementation by mediated equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 191-207.
    6. Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 2006. "Binary effectivity rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 167-181, December.
    7. Abdou, Joseph & Keiding, Hans, 2009. "Interaction sheaves on continuous domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, pages 708-719.
    8. Keiding, Hans & Peleg, Bezalel, 2006. "On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(7-8), pages 827-842, November.
    9. Sebastian Bervoets, 2010. "An axiomatic approach to predictability of outcomes in an interactive setting," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 311-323.
    10. Sebastian Bervoets, 2007. "Freedom of choice in a social context: comparing game forms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 295-315, September.
    11. E. Guzzini & A. Palestrini, 2012. "Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 83-100, February.
    12. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "Book review on "Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions", Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00666816, HAL.
    13. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:103-114 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D Procaccia, 2007. "Mediators Enable Truthful Voting," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000039, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. Bezalel Peleg, 2002. "Complete Characterization of Acceptable Game Forms by Effectivity Functions," Discussion Paper Series dp283, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    16. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
    17. Eyal Winter & Bezalel Peleg, 2002. "original papers : Constitutional implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(2), pages 187-204.

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