Binary effectivity rules
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References listed on IDEAS
- Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
- Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80.
- Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 2002.
"Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 241-263.
- Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 1999. "Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization," Discussion Papers 99-21, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 267-287, March.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
- Moulin, Herve, 1985. "From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-17, February.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans, 2009.
"Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 503-515, March.
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2005. "Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models," Discussion Paper Series dp404, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Peleg Bezalel & Peters Hans, 2005. "Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Bezalel Peleg & Ron Holzman, 2017.
"Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey,"
MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(4), pages 1-17, October.
- Bezalel Peleg & Ron Holzman, 2018. "Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey," Discussion Paper Series dp715, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2014.
"Representation of constitutions under incomplete information,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(2), pages 279-302, October.
- Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2013. "Representation of constitutions under incomplete information," Discussion Paper Series dp634, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
More about this item
KeywordsSocial choice correspondences; Effectivity functions; Nakamura’s number; Von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions; D71;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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