IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/huj/dispap/dp283.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Complete Characterization of Acceptable Game Forms by Effectivity Functions

Author

Listed:
  • Bezalel Peleg

    ()

Abstract

Acceptable game forms were introduced in Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978). Dutta (1984) considered effectivity functions of acceptable game forms. This paper unifies and extends the foregoing two papers. We obtain the following characterization of the effectivity functions of acceptable game forms: An effectivity function belongs to some acceptable game form if (i) it belongs to some Nash consistent game forms; and (ii) it satisfies an extra simple condition (our (3.1) or (4.2)). (Nash consistent game forms have already been characterized by their effectivity functions in Peleg et al. (2001).) As a corollary of our characterization we show that every acceptable game form violates minimal liberalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Bezalel Peleg, 2002. "Complete Characterization of Acceptable Game Forms by Effectivity Functions," Discussion Paper Series dp283, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp283
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp283.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    3. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    4. Keiding, Hans & Peleg, Bezalel, 2001. "Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 117-140, November.
    5. Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80.
    6. Deb, Rajat & Pattanaik, Prasanta K. & Razzolini, Laura, 1997. "Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 74-95, January.
    7. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 267-287, March.
    8. Hurwicz, Leonid & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1447-1474, November.
    9. Dutta, Bhaskar, 1984. "Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1151-1166, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael Simkin). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/crihuil.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.