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Book review on "Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions", Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    ()

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)

This is a review on the book by Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number hal-00666816.

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Date of creation: Feb 2013
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Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2013, 40 (2), pp.631-634. <10.1007/s00355-011-0595-5>
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00666816
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0595-5
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00666816
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  1. Abdou, J, 1988. "Neutral Veto Correspondences with a Continuum of Alternatives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(2), pages 135-64.
  2. Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 2003. "On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions," Discussion Papers 03-30, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  3. Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2002. "Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters," Discussion Paper Series dp308, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  4. Peleg Bezalel & Peters Hans, 2005. "Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 267-287, March.
  6. Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80.
  7. Holzman, Ron, 1986. "On strong representations of games by social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 39-57, February.
  8. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April.
  10. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
  11. Peleg, Bezalel, 2004. "Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 275-287, May.
  12. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-57, Jan.-Feb..
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