Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium
Implementation theory tackles the following problem: given a social choice correspondence, find a decentralized mechanism such that for every constellation of the individuals' preferences, the set of outcomes in equilibrium is exactly the set of socially optimal alternatives (as specified by the correspondence). In this paper we are concerned with implementation by mediated equilibrium; under such an equilibrium, a mediator coordinates the players' strategies in a way that discourages deviation. Our main result is a complete characterization of social choice correspondences which are implementable by mediated strong equilibrium. This characterization, in addition to being strikingly concise, implies that some important social choice correspondences which are not implementable by strong equilibrium are in fact implementable by mediated strong equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem|
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peleg,Bezalel, 2008.
"Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521074650, January.
- Peleg, Bezalel, 2002. "Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 395-423 Elsevier.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 49-67.
- Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
- Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
- Abdou, Joseph & Keiding, Hans, 2003. "On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 243-260, December.
- Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
- Abdou, J, 1995. "Nash and Strongly Consistent Two-Player Game Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(4), pages 345-356.
- Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D Procaccia, 2007. "Mediators Enable Truthful Voting," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000039, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia, 2007. "Mediators Enable Truthful Voting," Discussion Paper Series dp451, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Mizutani, Masayoshi & Hiraide, Yasuhiko & Nishino, Hisakazu, 1993. "Computational Complexity to Verify the Unstability of Effectivity Function," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(3), pages 225-239.
- Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding, 2001. "Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(2), pages 213-226. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp463. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tomer Siedner)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.