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Stability Index of Interaction forms

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  • Joseph M. Abdou

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

An interaction form is an abstract model of interaction based on a description of power distribution among agents over alternatives. A solution known as the settlement set is defined at any preference profile. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability, that is the existence of settlements, are established. A Stability Index that plays a role similar to that of the Naka- mura Number is defined. It measures, loosely speaking, the complexity of those configurations that prevent a settlement. To any strategic game form one can associate an interaction form in such a way that given an equilibrium concept (e.g. Nash or strong Nash) and a preference profile, settlements of the interaction form are precisely the equilibrium outcomes of the resulting game. As a consequence we have necessary and sufficient conditions for the solvability of game forms. The paper provides a localization of the index in case of unstability.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph M. Abdou, 2008. "Stability Index of Interaction forms," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00347438, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00347438
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00347438
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    2. Abdou, J, 1995. "Nash and Strongly Consistent Two-Player Game Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(4), pages 345-356.
    3. Abdou, Joseph & Keiding, Hans, 2003. "On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 243-260, December.
    4. J. Abdou, 1998. "Rectangularity and Tightness: A Normal Form Characterization of Perfect Information Extensive Game Forms," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 553-567, August.
    5. Abdou, J., 2000. "Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 263-275, May.
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