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The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms

  • Peleg, Bezalel
  • Tijs, Stef

We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE. In all these characterizations consistency and suitable variants of converse consistency play a role. Finally, the dominant NE correspondence is characterized. We also indicate how to generalize our results to Bayesian and extensive games.

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Article provided by Springer & Game Theory Society in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 25 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 13-34

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:13-34
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  1. Borm, P. E. M. & Tijs, S. H., 1992. "Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 58-71, January.
  2. Neyman, Abraham, 1989. "Uniqueness of the Shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 116-118, March.
  3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
  5. Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
  6. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  7. Maschler, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "The general nucleolus and the reduced game property," Other publications TiSEM ab187dab-1b5b-40c3-a673-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  8. repec:tiu:tiutis:e52774ec-5d61-41f8-8325-b9cf91b9f6a4 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  10. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
  11. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
  12. Tadenuma, K, 1992. "Reduced Games, Consistency, and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 325-34.
  13. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  14. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
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