The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form
We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE. In all these characterizations consistency and suitable variants of converse consistency play a role. Finally, the dominant NE correspondence is characterized. We also indicate how to generalize our results to Bayesian and extensive games.
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|Date of creation:||1993|
|Date of revision:|
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0acf76c8-5da7-4972-a4fa-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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- repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
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