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Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present two characterization results; both require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. One of them requires the allocations to be envy free (with respect to trades) and the other--stable with respect to bilateral recontracting. The characterizations hold in classes of exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, and also on domains with a finite number of potential agents.

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File URL: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/199603/full.pdf
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Paper provided by Nir Dagan in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 012.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:012
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.

Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/

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  1. Thomson, William & Zhou, Lin, 1993. "Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 575-87, May.
  2. Nir Dagan, 1995. "Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: a Characterization of the Price Mechanism," Economic theory and game theory 011, Nir Dagan.
  3. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
  4. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  5. van den Nouweland, A. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S., 1996. "Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 355-372.
  6. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
  7. Mas-Colell,Andreu, 1985. "The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521265140, June.
  8. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
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