Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
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- van den Nouweland, A. & Tijs, S. & Wooders, M., 1995.
"Axiomatizations of Lindhal and Ratio Equilibria in Public Good Economies,"
9577, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Tijs, S.H. & Wooders, M.H., 1995. "Axiomatizations of Lindahl and ratio equilibria in public good economies," Discussion Paper 1995-77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi, 1992. "Walrasian social choice in a large economy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 73-78, August.
- Peters, H. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J., 1994.
"A reduced game property for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and egalitarian bargaining solutions,"
Other publications TiSEM
757cbb5b-f7ba-42ec-91e9-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Peters, Hans & Tijs, Stef & Zarzuelo, Jose, 1994. "A reduced game property for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and egalitarian bargaining solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 11-18, February.
- Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
- Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
- van Heumen, R. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H. & Borm, P.E.M., 1996.
"Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games,"
Other publications TiSEM
6cc729cb-f5e8-496a-a365-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Heumen, R.W.J. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H. & Borm, P.E.M., 1994. "Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games," Research Memorandum FEW 680, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
- Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi, 1991. "A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 106-123, June.
- Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
- Mas-Colell, Andrew, 1974. "An equilibrium existence theorem without complete or transitive preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 237-246, December.
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