Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies
We characterize the Pareto correspondence, the core and the Walras solution using the axioms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Consistency and its converse are defined with respect to suitably constructed reduced economies for each case. Our results hold for the well-known class of coalitional production economies, which covers exchange economies as a particular case. The key reason to use this class is the observation that the reduction of an exchange economy yields a production economy. Author Keywords: Consistency; Reduced economy; Core; Walrasian equilibrium
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