Two Derivations of the Uniform Rule and an Application to Bankruptcy
We consider the problem of allocating a single infinitely divisible commodity to agents with single-peaked preferences, and establish two properties of the rule that has played the central role in the analysis of this problem, the uniform role. Among the efficient allocations, it selects (1) the one at which the difference between the largest amount received by any agent and the smallest sush amount is minimal, and (2) the one at which the variance of the amounts received by the agents is minimal.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
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- Hans Peters & Gert-Jan Otten & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences (*),"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 291-306.
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- Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1997. "Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 305-333.
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