Two Derivations of the Uniform Rule and an Application to Bankruptcy
We consider the problem of allocating a single infinitely divisible commodity to agents with single-peaked preferences, and establish two properties of the rule that has played the central role in the analysis of this problem, the uniform role. Among the efficient allocations, it selects (1) the one at which the difference between the largest amount received by any agent and the smallest sush amount is minimal, and (2) the one at which the variance of the amounts received by the agents is minimal.
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