Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties, describing the effect of population and endowment variations on the outcome. The central properties which are studied in this context are population monotonicity, bilateral consistency, (endowment) monotonicity and (endowment) strategy-proofness. Furthermore, the uniform reallocation rule is Pareto optimal and satisfies several equity conditions, e.g., equal-treatment and envy-freeness. We study the trade-off between properties concerning variation and properties concerning equity. Furthermore, we provide several characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule based on these properties.
Volume (Year): 10 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: August 29, 1995; revised version June 26, 1996|
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- Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
- Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
- Thomson, William, 1995.
"Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked,"
Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 229-46, March.
- Thomson, W., 1991. "Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division when Preferences are Single-Peaked," RCER Working Papers 302, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Klaus Bettina & Peters Hans & Storcken Ton, 1995. "Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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