Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
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- Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2009. "Sequential Sharing Rules for River Sharing Problems," Working Papers 2009.114, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
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