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Water allocation by social choice rules: The case of sequential rules

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  • Goetz, Renan U.
  • Martinez, Yolanda
  • Rodrigo, Jofre

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of allocating shares of irrigation water to different agricultural agents with single-peaked preferences with respect to their own shares. We define two different sequential allocation rules that respect the asymmetry between the agents and maintain the properties of Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness, and we design a specific algorithm to apply these rules. The results of the empirical application of these rules for the case of an irrigated area located in the Ebro Basin (Spain) show that the designed sequential rules are able to substantially improve the efficiency of the currently applied proportional rule in context of severe scarcity of water and/or high administrative water prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Goetz, Renan U. & Martinez, Yolanda & Rodrigo, Jofre, 2008. "Water allocation by social choice rules: The case of sequential rules," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 304-314, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:65:y:2008:i:2:p:304-314
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Farzane Karami & Alireza B. Dariane, 2018. "Many-Objective Multi-Scenario Algorithm for Optimal Reservoir Operation Under Future Uncertainties," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 32(12), pages 3887-3902, September.
    4. Yang Zheng & Xuefeng Sang & Zhiwu Liu & Siqi Zhang & Pan Liu, 2022. "Water Allocation Management Under Scarcity: a Bankruptcy Approach," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 36(9), pages 2891-2912, July.
    5. Jordi Honey-Rosés, 2009. "Reviewing the arguments for market based approaches to water distribution: a critical assessment for sustainable water management in Spain," Sustainable Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(6), pages 357-364.
    6. Dedi Liu & Xiaohong Chen & Zhanghua Lou, 2010. "A Model for the Optimal Allocation of Water Resources in a Saltwater Intrusion Area: A Case Study in Pearl River Delta in China," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(1), pages 63-81, January.
    7. Kampas, Athanasios & Petsakos, Athanasios & Rozakis, Stelios, 2012. "Price induced irrigation water saving: Unraveling conflicts and synergies between European agricultural and water policies for a Greek Water District," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 28-38.
    8. Mahboubeh Kalantari & Mohammad Reza Nikoo & Nasser Talebbeydokhti, 2025. "Assessment of renewable water in the face of climate change by a comprehensive analysis of adaptation strategies," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 178(3), pages 1-24, March.
    9. Honey-Rosés, Jordi & Acuña, Vicenç & Bardina, Mònica & Brozović, Nicholas & Marcé, Rafael & Munné, Antoni & Sabater, Sergi & Termes, Montserrat & Valero, Fernando & Vega, Àlex & Schneider, Daniel W., 2013. "Examining the Demand for Ecosystem Services: The Value of Stream Restoration for Drinking Water Treatment Managers in the Llobregat River, Spain," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 196-205.

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