Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
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More about this item
KeywordsStrategy-proofness; Single-peaked preference; Second-best efficiency; Generalized uniform rule; D63; D71; D78;
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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