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Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

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  • Shinji Ohseto

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  • Shinji Ohseto, 2006. "Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 111-121, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:111-121
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-954, July.
    2. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    3. Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Bo Larsson, 2002. "Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(3), pages 483-502.
    4. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-1039, July.
    5. Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William, 1995. "Games of Fair Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 191-204, May.
    6. Shinji Ohseto, 2000. "Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 365-374.
    7. Szilvia Pápai, 2003. "Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 371-385, June.
    8. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
    9. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    10. Moulin, H., 1986. "Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-78, October.
    11. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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