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Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets

  • Yuji Fujinaka
  • Takuma Wakayama

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (ii) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (iii) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case.

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File URL: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2008/DP0727R.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0727.

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Date of creation: Dec 2008
Date of revision: Feb 2009
Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0727
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