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Mechanism design in queueing problems

Author

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  • Manipushpak Mitra

    (Indian Statistical Institute, 7, S. J. S. S. Marg, New Delhi-110016, INDIA .)

Abstract

A well-known result in incentive theory is that for a very broad class of decision problems, there is no mechanism which achieves truth-telling in dominant strategies, efficiency and budget balancedness (or first best implementability). On the contrary, Mitra and Sen (1998), prove that linear cost queueing problems are first best implementable. This paper is an attempt at identification of cost structures for which queueing problems are first best implementable. The broad conclusion is that, this is a fairly large class. Some of these first best implementable problems can be implemented by mechanisms that satisfy individual rationality.

Suggested Citation

  • Manipushpak Mitra, 2001. "Mechanism design in queueing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(2), pages 277-305.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:17:y:2001:i:2:p:277-305
    Note: Received: October 19, 1999; revised version: March 13, 2000.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mitra, Manipushpak, 2005. "Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 165(1), pages 251-266, August.
    2. Conan Mukherjee, 2013. "Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 131-163, February.
    3. Manipushpak Mitra & Arunava Sen, 2010. "Efficient allocation of heterogenous commodities with balanced transfers," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 29-48, June.
    4. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2008. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    5. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
    6. Youngsub Chun, 2006. "No-envy in queueing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 151-162, September.
    7. Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 107-131, September.
    8. Stefano Galavotti & Nozomu Muto & Daisuke Oyama, 2011. "On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 87-123, September.
    9. Alex Gershkov & Paul Schweinzer, 2010. "When queueing is better than push and shove," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 409-430, July.
    10. Kayi, C. & Ramaekers, E., 2008. "An impossibility in sequencing problems," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    11. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2017. "Reordering an existing queue," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 65-87, June.
    12. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2012. "Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 473-480, March.
    13. Moulin, Herve, 2005. "Split-Proof Probabilistic Scheduling," Working Papers 2004-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    14. Moulin, Herve, 2005. "Minimizing the Worst Slowdown: Off-Line and On-Line," Working Papers 2005-03, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    15. Heydenreich, B. & Mishra, D. & Müller, R.J. & Uetz, M.J., 2008. "Optimal mechanisms for single machine scheduling," Research Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    16. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2014. "Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 425-442, June.
    17. Moulin, Herve, 2004. "On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting and Transferring of Jobs," Working Papers 2004-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    18. De, Parikshit, 2014. "Rawlsian Allocation In Queueing And Sequencing Problem," MPRA Paper 58744, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Youngsub Chun, 2011. "Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 29-41, February.
    20. René Brink & Youngsub Chun, 2012. "Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 519-529, March.
    21. De, Parikshit, 2013. "Incentive and normative analysis on sequencing problem," MPRA Paper 55127, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dominant strategy incentive compatibility; Efficiency; Budget balancedness; Individual rationality.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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