A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Pycia, Marek & Troyan, Peter, 2022. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 14043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
- Ke, Shaowei, 2019. "Boundedly rational backward induction," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
- Rustamdjan Hakimov & Onur Kesten, 2018.
"The Equitable Top Trading Cycles Mechanism For School Choice,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 2219-2258, November.
- Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kesten, Onur, 2014. "The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2014-210, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Ashlagi, Itai & Gonczarowski, Yannai A., 2018. "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 405-425.
- Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-438, March.
- Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson & Guillermo Moloche & Stephen Weinberg, 2006. "Costly Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1043-1068, September.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012.
"Robust Mechanism Design,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 2, pages 49-96,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2004.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org.
- Joshua Schwartzstein & Adi Sunderam, 2021.
"Using Models to Persuade,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(1), pages 276-323, January.
- Joshua Schwartzstein & Adi Sunderam, 2019. "Using Models to Persuade," NBER Working Papers 26109, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2010.
"Course Bidding At Business Schools,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 99-123, February.
- Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Course Bidding at Business Schools," Game Theory and Information 0306001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Jan 2004.
- Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2005. "Course Bidding at Business Schools," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 618, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper 104044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- , A. & ,, 2011.
"Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
- Parag A. Pathak & Jay Sethuraman, 2010. "Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result," NBER Working Papers 16140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mackenzie, Andrew, 2018. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Research Memorandum 014, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- John Hatfield, 2009. "Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 505-515, September.
- Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2019.
"Strategically Simple Mechanisms,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2003-2035, November.
- Tilman Borgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2148, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 6844, CESifo.
- Tilman Borgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Papers 1812.00849, arXiv.org.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- Eric Budish & Estelle Cantillon, 2012.
"The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2237-2271, August.
- Eric Budish & Estelle Cantillon, 2009. "The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard," Working Papers ECARES 2010-02, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Cantillon, Estelle & Budish, Eric, 2010. "The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard," CEPR Discussion Papers 7641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eric Budish & Estelle Cantillon, 2012. "The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/99376, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Lars Ehlers & Thayer Morrill, 2020.
"(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(4), pages 1837-1875.
- EHLERS, Lars & MORRILL, Thayer, 2017. "(Il)legal assignments in school choice," Cahiers de recherche 2017-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Lars EHLERS & Thayer MORRILL, 2017. "(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice," Cahiers de recherche 04-2017, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2010.
"Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1625-1672, September.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2008. "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1677, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Liran Einav & Chiara Farronato & Jonathan Levin & Neel Sundaresan, 2018. "Auctions versus Posted Prices in Online Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(1), pages 178-215.
- Pycia, Marek & Unver, Utku, 2017.
"Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
- Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 715, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 11 Mar 2014.
- Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "On the revelation of preferences for public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 79-93, August.
- Hagerty, Kathleen M. & Rogerson, William P., 1987. "Robust trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 94-107, June.
- William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
- Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
- Luyao Zhang & Dan Levin, 2017. "Bounded Rationality and Robust Mechanism Design: An Axiomatic Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 235-239, May.
- Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.
- Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew, 2020. "Essentially stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 370-390.
- Alex Gershkov & Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013.
"On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 197-220, January.
- Alex Gershkov & Jacob Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2012. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Working Papers tecipa-445, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Peter Troyan, 2019. "Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Top Trading Cycles," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1249-1261, August.
- Jiangtao Li & Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?," GRAPE Working Papers 42, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
- Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 2010. "Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1905-1938, November.
- David Laibson, 1997.
"Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
- Laibson, David I., 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," Scholarly Articles 4481499, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Optimal Auction Design,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Edi Karni & Marie-Louise Vier?, 2013.
""Reverse Bayesianism": A Choice-Based Theory of Growing Awareness,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2790-2810, December.
- Edi Karni & Marie-Louise Viero, 2010. ""reverse Bayesianism": A Choice-based Theory Of Growing Awareness," Working Paper 1258, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Edi Karni & Marie-Louise Vierø, 2012. ""Reverse Bayesianism": A Choice-Based Theory of Growing Awareness," Economics Working Paper Archive 591, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Jeheil Phillippe, 1995. "Limited Horizon Forecast in Repeated Alternate Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 497-519, December.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
- Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001.
"Temptation and Self-Control,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
- W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999. "Temptation and Self-Control," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f1, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1636-1652, September.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
- Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
- Shuchi Chawla & Jason Hartline & David Malec & Balasubramanian Sivan, 2010. "Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1486, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Alex Rees-Jones, 2017. "Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 225-229, May.
- Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
- Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
- Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019.
"Obviousness around the clock,"
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior
SP II 2019-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019. "Obviousness Around the Clock," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 151, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
- Alexey Kushnir, 2013. "On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of correlated types," ECON - Working Papers 129, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2016. ""Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-Proof Environment," Working Paper 413411, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
- Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
- Carroll, Gabriel, 2014. "A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 163-177.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
- Čopič, Jernej & Ponsatí, Clara, 2016. "Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 276-287.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo, 2023.
"The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 515-528.
- Josue Ortega & Thilo Klein, 2022. "The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice," Papers 2204.07255, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
- Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
- Catonini, Emiliano & Xue, Jingyi, 2020.
"Local Dominance,"
Economics and Statistics Working Papers
1-2021, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Emiliano Catonini & Jingyi Xue, 2020. "Local Dominance," Papers 2012.14432, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Ortega, Josue & Klein, Thilo, 2022.
"Improving efficiency and equality in school choice,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
22-046, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo, 2022. "Improving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice," QBS Working Paper Series 2022/02, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
- Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022.
"Menu mechanisms,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2020. "Menu Mechanisms," Discussion papers e-19-012, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2022. "On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
- Jiangtao Li & Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?," GRAPE Working Papers 42, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
- Clayton Thomas, 2020. "Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof," Papers 2011.12367, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
- Rustamdjan Hakimov & Madhav Raghavan, 2023. "Improving Transparency and Verifiability in School Admissions: Theory and Experiment," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 376, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021.
"Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey,"
EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488.
- Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488, June.
- Pinaki Mandal & Souvik Roy, 2022. "Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 261-290, February.
- Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms," Papers 2212.08709, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
- Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2022. "Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Theory and Laboratory Evidence," Working Papers 299, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper 104044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pycia, Marek & Ãœnver, M. Utku, 2020. "Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15377, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2020. "Making the Most of Limited Government Capacity: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 2020-7, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Pinaki Mandal, 2022. "Simple dominance of fixed priority top trading cycles," Papers 2204.02154, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
- Soo Hong Chew & Wenqian Wang, 2022. "Information Design of Dynamic Mechanisms," Papers 2205.10844, arXiv.org.
- Cerrone, Claudia & Hermstrüwer, Yoan & Kesten, Onur, 2021.
"School Choice with Consent: An Experiment,"
Working Papers
2021-09, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised Feb 2022.
- Claudia Cerrone & Yoan Hermstrüwer & Onur Kesten, 2022. "School Choice with Consent: An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2022_02, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Jul 2023.
- Yves Breitmoser & Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2022. "Obviousness around the clock," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 483-513, April.
- Mariya Halushka, 2021. "Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information," Working Papers 2104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Mehmet Barlo & Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2022. "Computational implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 605-633, December.
- Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions," Papers 2209.13148, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
- Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022.
"Menu mechanisms,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2020. "Menu Mechanisms," Discussion papers e-19-012, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2022. "Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 581-604, December.
- Debasis Mishra & Abdul Quadir, 2012. "Deterministic single object auctions with private values," Discussion Papers 12-06, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006.
"Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," NBER Working Papers 11965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 639, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 2008. "The 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Mechanism Design Theory," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 237-260, June.
- Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2019. "Empirical strategy-proofness," Papers 1907.12408, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
- Shengwu Li, 2017.
"Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
- Li, Shengwu, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 78930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Patrick Harless & William Phan, 2020. "On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley–Scarf model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(2), pages 411-435, September.
- Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan & D. Marc Kilgour, 2015.
"A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices,"
Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 401-413, May.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd & Kilgour, D. Marc, "undated". "A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices," Working Papers WP2011/2, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd R & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices," MPRA Paper 28999, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pycia, Marek & Ãœnver, M. Utku, 2020. "Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15377, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- , & , & ,, 2007.
"Secure implementation,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjöström & Takehiko Yamato, 2004. "Secure Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000615, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005. "Secure Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0056, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016. "Optimal allocation of an indivisible good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 95-112.
- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2015.
"Centralized allocation in multiple markets,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 74-85.
- Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2012. "Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets," Economics Working Papers 2012-09, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "Centralized allocation in multiple markets," Textos para discussão 322, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
- Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers 2403.18694, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
- Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016. "Voting and optimal provision of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 35-41.
- Anno, Hidekazu & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2016. "On the operation of multiple matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 166-185.
- Schummer, James, 2000. "Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 293-318, February.
- Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2021.
"Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 650-668, June.
- Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets," Working Papers 1913, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Simplicity; simple dominance; limited foresight; obvious dominance; strongly obvious dominance; market design; mechanism design; extensive-form games; auctions; allocation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2021-07-12 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2021-07-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2021-07-12 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zur:econwp:393. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Severin Oswald (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/seizhch.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.