A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design
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More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-DES-2019-10-21 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2019-10-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2019-10-21 (Microeconomics)
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