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On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options

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  • Mandal, Pinaki
  • Roy, Souvik

Abstract

We study the implementation of a fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rule via an obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanism (Li, 2017) in the context of assignment problems with outside options, where agents are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. In a model without outside options, Troyan (2019) gives a sufficient (but not necessary) and Mandal and Roy (2020) give a necessary and sufficient condition for an FPTTC rule to be OSP-implementable. This paper shows that in a model with outside options, the two conditions (in Troyan (2019) and Mandal and Roy (2020)) are equivalent for an FPTTC rule, and each of them is necessary and sufficient for an FPTTC rule to be OSP-implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2022. "On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:211:y:2022:i:c:s0165176521004754
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110239
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ashlagi, Itai & Gonczarowski, Yannai A., 2018. "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 405-425.
    2. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper 104044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Shengwu Li, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
    4. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2020. "On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    6. Bade, Sophie, 2019. "Matching with single-peaked preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 81-99.
    7. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
    8. Peter Troyan, 2019. "Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Top Trading Cycles," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1249-1261, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fixed priority top trading cycles; Obvious strategy-proofness; Indivisible goods; Outside options;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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