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All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Arribillaga

    (Universidad de San Luis/CONICET)

  • Jordi Massó

    (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

  • Alejandro Neme

    (Universidad de San Luis/CONICET)

Abstract

For division problems with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, eficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2021. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Working Papers 49, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:49
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    Cited by:

    1. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2020. "On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    2. Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 38(4), pages 175-192, Fall.
    3. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2025. "Group Obvious Strategy-proofness: Definition and Characterization," Working Papers 372, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    4. Pablo R. Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2023. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Working Papers 293, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    5. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2025. "Group Obvious Strategy-proofness: Definition and Characterization," Working Papers 1533, Barcelona School of Economics.
    6. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
    7. Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka & Thomson, William, 2024. "Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    8. Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    9. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    10. Alexander L. Brown & Daniel G. Stephenson & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2024. "Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms," Papers 2404.11883, arXiv.org.
    11. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2024. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Working Papers 1456, Barcelona School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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