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Group Obvious Strategy-proofness: Definition and Characterization

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Arribillaga

    (UNSL/CONICET)

  • Jordi Massó

    (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona/Barcelona School of Economics)

  • Alejandro Neme

    (UNSL/CONICET)

Abstract

We introduce the concept of group obvious strategy-proofness, an extension of Li (2017)’s notion of obvious strategy-proofness, by requiring that truth-tellingremains an obviously dominant strategy for any group of agents in the extensive game form implementing the social choice function. We show that this stronger condition isno more restrictive: the set of all group obviously strategy-proof social choice functions coincides with the set of all obviously strategy-proof social choice functions. Building on this equivalence result and existing results on obvious strategy-proofness, we derive further equivalence results concerning the implementability of social choice functions via round-table mechanisms: strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, obvious strategy-proofness, and group obvious strategy-proofness are all equivalent.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2025. "Group Obvious Strategy-proofness: Definition and Characterization," Working Papers 372, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:372
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/372.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2023. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    2. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
    3. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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