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Local Dominance

Author

Listed:
  • Catonini, Emiliano

    (Higher School of Economics, ICEF)

  • Xue, Jingyi

    (School of Economics, Singapore Management University)

Abstract

We define a local notion of weak dominance that speaks to the true choice problems among actions in a game tree and does not necessarily require to plan optimally for the future. A strategy is (globally) weakly dominant if and only if it prescribes a locally weakly dominant action at every decision node it reaches, and in this case local weak dominance is characterized by a (wishful-thinking) condition that requires no forward planning. From this local perspective, we identify form of contingent reasoning that are particularly natural, despite the absence of an obviously dominant strategy (Li, 2017). Following this approach, we construct a dynamic game that implements the Top Trading Cycles allocation under a notion of local obvious dominance that captures a form of independence of irrelevant alternatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Catonini, Emiliano & Xue, Jingyi, 2020. "Local Dominance," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 1-2021, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:smuesw:2021_001
    as

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    Other versions of this item:

    • Emiliano Catonini & Jingyi Xue, 2020. "Local Dominance," Papers 2012.14432, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ashlagi, Itai & Gonczarowski, Yannai A., 2018. "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 405-425.
    2. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
    3. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Weak dominance; obvious dominance; strategy-proofness; implementation;
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