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R. Pablo Arribillaga

Personal Details

First Name:R. Pablo
Middle Name:
Last Name:Arribillaga
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:par402
http://www.pabloarribillaga.weebly.com/

Affiliation

Grupo de Teoría de Juegos
Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (IMASL)
Universidad Nacional de San Luis

San Luis, Argentina
http://www.gtj.unsl.edu.ar/
RePEc:edi:gtnslar (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2022. "Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules," Papers 2210.11627, arXiv.org.
  2. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustín G. Bonifacio & Marcelo A. Fernandez, 2022. "Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules," Working Papers 166, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  3. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2021. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Working Papers 49, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  4. Arribillaga, Pablo & Bergantiños, Gustavo, 2019. "Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem," MPRA Paper 91719, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2019. "On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness," Working Papers 1122, Barcelona School of Economics.
  6. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó, 2014. "Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 946.14, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2013. "On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game," Working Papers 740, Barcelona School of Economics.

Articles

  1. R. Pablo Arribillaga & G. Bergantiños, 2022. "Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 805-830, November.
  2. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2020. "On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  3. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó, 2017. "Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 74-107, November.
  4. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi, 2016. "Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
  5. R. Arribillaga, 2015. "Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 23(2), pages 521-534, July.
  6. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2014. "On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game," Journal of Applied Mathematics, Hindawi, vol. 2014, pages 1-20, April.
  7. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 0. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2021. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Working Papers 49, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).

    Cited by:

    1. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2019. "On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness," Working Papers 1122, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
    3. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2020. "Menu Mechanisms," Discussion papers e-19-012, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    4. Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.

  2. Arribillaga, Pablo & Bergantiños, Gustavo, 2019. "Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem," MPRA Paper 91719, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Teresa Estañ & Natividad Llorca & Ricardo Martínez & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2021. "On the Difficulty of Budget Allocation in Claims Problems with Indivisible Items and Prices," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(5), pages 1133-1159, October.
    2. Teresa Estañ & Natividad Llorca & Ricardo Martínez & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2020. "On the difficulty of budget allocation in claims problems with indivisible items of different prices," ThE Papers 20/09, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..

  3. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2019. "On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness," Working Papers 1122, Barcelona School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    2. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2022. "On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    3. Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "On the implementation of the median," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).

  4. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó, 2014. "Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 946.14, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

    Cited by:

    1. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2018. "On random social choice functions with the tops-only property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 413-435.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2017. "Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp," NBER Working Papers 23265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2020. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness:median-voting over intervals," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 20.04, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    4. Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander Nesterov, 2020. "Comparing School Choice And College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity To Strategic Admissions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 222/EC/2020, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    5. Matias Nunez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Unanimous Implementation: A Case For Approval Mechanisms," Working Papers hal-01270275, HAL.
    6. DECERF, Benoit & VAN DER LINDEN, Martin, 2016. "A criterion to compare mechanisms when solutions are not unique, with applications to constrained school choice," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2016033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 0. "Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    8. Gopakumar Achuthankutty & Souvik Roy, 2018. "On single-peaked domains and min–max rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(4), pages 753-772, December.
    9. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2018. "Strategy-proof location of public facilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 21-48.
    10. Gopakumar Achuthankutty & Souvik Roy, 2020. "Strategy-proof rules on partially single-peaked domains," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2020-020, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    11. Martin Van der linden, 2016. "Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00019, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    12. Protopapas, Panos, 2018. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals," MPRA Paper 83939, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Matías Núñez & Carlos Pimienta & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2018. "Implementing the Median," Discussion Papers 2018-11, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    14. Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "On the implementation of the median," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).

  5. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2013. "On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game," Working Papers 740, Barcelona School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Robles & Marina Núñez, 2014. "One-seller assignment markets with multiunit demands," UB Economics Working Papers 2014/316, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB School of Economics.

Articles

  1. R. Pablo Arribillaga & G. Bergantiños, 2022. "Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 805-830, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2020. "On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó, 2017. "Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 74-107, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    2. DECERF, Benoit & VAN DER LINDEN, Martin, 2016. "A criterion to compare mechanisms when solutions are not unique, with applications to constrained school choice," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2016033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Martin Van der linden, 2016. "Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00018, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    4. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2022. "Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules," Papers 2210.11627, arXiv.org.
    5. Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "On the implementation of the median," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).

  4. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi, 2016. "Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. R. Arribillaga, 2015. "Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 23(2), pages 521-534, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Camelia Bejan & Juan Camilo Gómez, 2018. "Equal treatment without large numbers," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1239-1259, November.

  6. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2014. "On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game," Journal of Applied Mathematics, Hindawi, vol. 2014, pages 1-20, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 0. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 12 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (6) 2019-07-22 2019-11-04 2021-05-17 2022-09-12 2022-10-03 2022-11-07. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2013-12-20 2019-11-04 2022-09-12 2022-11-07 2022-11-21. Author is listed
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (5) 2014-03-01 2014-03-08 2022-09-12 2022-11-07 2022-11-21. Author is listed
  4. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (4) 2014-03-01 2014-03-08 2022-11-07 2022-11-21
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2013-12-20 2014-03-01 2014-03-08 2019-02-11
  6. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (4) 2019-07-22 2019-11-04 2019-11-04 2021-05-17
  7. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2022-11-07
  8. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2013-12-20

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