Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability
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- Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi, 2016. "Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
- R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó, 2014. "Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 946.14, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2017. "Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp," NBER Working Papers 23265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Van der linden, 2016. "Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00019, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Protopapas, Panos, 2018. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals," MPRA Paper 83939, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Matias Nunez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Unanimous Implementation: A Case For Approval Mechanisms," Working Papers hal-01270275, HAL.
- DECERF, Benoit & VAN DER LINDEN, Martin, 2016. "A criterion to compare mechanisms when solutions are not unique, with applications to constrained school choice," CORE Discussion Papers 2016033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017. "On Single-peaked Domains and Min-max Rules," MPRA Paper 81375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywordsgeneralized median voting schemes; strategy-proofness; anonymity;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-03-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2014-03-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2014-03-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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