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On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-Peakedness

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  • Jordi Massé
  • Inés Moreno de Barreda

Abstract

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Jordi Massé & Inés Moreno de Barreda, 2010. "On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-Peakedness," Working Papers 421, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:421
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. John Weymark, 2011. "A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 529-550, December.
    2. Carmelo Rodríguez-à lvarez, 2017. "On single-peakedness and strategy-proofness: ties between adjacent alternatives," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(3), pages 1966-1974.
    3. Yu He & Alexander Lam & Minming Li, 2024. "Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects," Papers 2402.18908, arXiv.org.
    4. Shuhei Morimoto, 2013. "Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 637-669, September.
    5. Martínez-Mora Francisco & Puy M. Socorro, 2012. "Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, December.
    6. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme, 2015. "Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(2), pages 227-250, September.
    7. Aziz, Haris & Chan, Hau & Lee, Barton E. & Parkes, David C., 2020. "The capacity constrained facility location problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 478-490.
    8. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2020. "Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 237-258, March.
    9. Brady, Richard L. & Chambers, Christopher P., 2015. "Spatial implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 200-205.
    10. Makoto Hagiwara & Hirofumi Yamamura, 2020. "Upper set rules with binary ranges," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 657-666, April.
    11. Freeman, Rupert & Pennock, David M. & Peters, Dominik & Wortman Vaughan, Jennifer, 2021. "Truthful aggregation of budget proposals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategy-proofness; Single-peaked preferences; Median Voter; Feasibility Constraints;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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