Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, reversibility, and an equal-treatment condition. The resulting rule turns out to be peaks-only and individually rational: the allocation assigned by the rule depends only on the peaks of the preferences, and no agent is worse off than at his individual endowment.
Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: 8 September 1995/Accepted: 30 October 1996|
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