Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness
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Cited by:
- Ernesto Savaglio & Stefano Vannucci, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bounded distributive lattices," Papers 1406.5120, arXiv.org.
- Brady, Richard L. & Chambers, Christopher P., 2015. "Spatial implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 200-205.
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