Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
This paper investigates the structures of strategy-proof mechanisms in general models of economies with pure public goods. Under the assumptions that the set of allocations is a subset of some finite-dimensional Euclidean space and that the admissible preferencees are continuous and convex, I establish that any strategy-proof mechanism is dictatorial whenever the decision problem is of more than one dimension. Furthermore, I establish a similar result when preference relations also satisfy the additional assumption of monotonicity. These results properly extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to economies with pure public goods.
Volume (Year): 58 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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