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- Single-Peaked Preferences With Several Commodities


  • Pablo Amorós

    (Universidad de Alicante)


We consider the problem of allocating m(m>=2) infinitely divisible commodities among agents with single-peaked preferences. In the two-agents case any strategy-proof and efficient solution is dictatorial. First, we propose a solution that, in the two-agents case, is the only one that satisfies strategy-proofness, no-envy and a weak requirement related to efficiency. Moreover, it is implementable in dominant strategies and satisfies consistency properties. Second, we propose an extension of the Mas-Colells Walrasian equilibrium with slack to characterize the efficient allocations.This new solution allow us to associate with each efficient allocation an income redistribution necessary to obtain it. We prove that the original solution proposed by Mas-Colell is the efficient selection which requires an income redistribution with smallest range, and that it satisfies consistency properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Amorós, 1998. "- Single-Peaked Preferences With Several Commodities," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1998-23

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S., 1998. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 272-291, November.
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    4. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
    5. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
    6. Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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    10. Dagan, Nir, 1996. "A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 255-261, April.
    11. Ching, Stephen, 1992. "A simple characterization of the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 57-60, September.
    12. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56.
    13. Thomson, W., 1991. "Resource-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Divosion when Preferences are Single-Peaked ," RCER Working Papers 301, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    14. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 587-597.
    15. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Voting under Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 298-321, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Package Assignment," Working Papers 2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.


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