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Limitation of Efficiency: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peaked Preferences with Many Commodities


  • Sasaki, Hiroo

    (Rice U and Waseda U)


In this paper, we study a resource allocation problem of economies with many commodities and single-peaked preferences. It is known that the uniform rule is the unique allocation mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and anonymity, if the number of good is only one and preferences are single peaked. (Sprumont [7].) However, if the number of goods is greater than one, the situation drastically changes and a tradeoff between efficiency and strategy-proofness arises. The generalized uniform rule in multiple-commodity settings is still strategy-proof, but not Pareto efficient in general. In this paper, we show that in a class of all strategy-proof mechanisms the generalized uniform rule is a "second best" strategy-proof mechanism in that there is no other strategy-proof mechanism which gives a "better" outcome than the generalized uniform rule in terms of Pareto domination.

Suggested Citation

  • Sasaki, Hiroo, 2003. "Limitation of Efficiency: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peaked Preferences with Many Commodities," Working Papers 2003-01, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2003-01

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
    2. Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A., 2003. "Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 246-263, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anno, Hidekazu & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2016. "On the operation of multiple matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 166-185.
    2. Adachi, Tsuyoshi, 2010. "The uniform rule with several commodities: A generalization of Sprumont's characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 952-964, November.

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