Strategy-proof risk sharing
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Schmeidler, 1989.
"Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
7662, David K. Levine.
- Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May.
- Antoine Billot & Alain Chateauneuf & Itzhak Gilboa & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2000.
"Sharing beliefs: between agreeing and disagreeing,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
- Tallon, Jean-Marc & Dana, Rose-Anne & Chateauneuf, Alain, 2000.
"Optimal risk-sharing rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility,"
Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine
123456789/5461, Paris Dauphine University.
- Chateauneuf, Alain & Dana, Rose-Anne & Tallon, Jean-Marc, 2000. "Optimal risk-sharing rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 191-214, October.
- Alain Chateauneuf & Rose Anne Dana & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2000. "Optimal risk-sharing rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00451997, HAL.
- MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, 1998.
"Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies,"
Cahiers de recherche
9805, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 1999. "Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 583-595.
- Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993.
1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Benassy, Jean-Pascal, 1986.
"On Competitive Market Mechanisms,"
Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 95-108, January.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, March.
- Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A., 2003. "Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 246-263, April.
- Sobel, Joel, 1998. "Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt1x32m32n, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, 08.
- Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2004. "Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 573-592, August.
- Miki Kato & Shinji Ohseto, 2002. "Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 659-664.
- Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
- Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
- Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-93, November.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Thomson, William, 1984. "The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 447-60, July.
- McKelvey, Richard D & Page, Talbot, 1986. "Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 109-27, January.
- Hurwicz, L, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 217-25, April.
- Sobel, Joel, 1981. "Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 597-619, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:225-254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.