Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies
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- Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
- Eric Maskin, 1998.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995.
Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
- Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-27, January.
- Mark A. Satterthwaite, 2001. "Strategy-proofness and markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 37-58.
- Shigehiro Serizawa, 1999. "Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 121-146, January.
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