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No-envy and dominant strategy implementability in non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear preferences

  • Katsuhiko Nishizaki

    ()

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

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    This paper studies the relationship between no-envy (Foley, D. (1967) "Resource allocation and the public sector," Yale Economics Essays 7, pp.45-98) and dominant strategy implementability in non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. The main result shows that the combination of non-bossiness (Satterthwaite, M. A. and H. Sonnenschein (1981) "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms at differentiable points," Review of Economic Studies 48, pp.587-597) and equal treatment of equals is equivalent to no-envy under strategy-proof social choice functions in the economies which are incompatible with strict monotonic closedness (Fleurbaey, M. and F. Maniquet (1997) "Implementability and horizontal equity imply no-envy," Econometrica 65, pp.1215-1219).

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I1-P52.pdf
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    Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

    Volume (Year): 33 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 557-563

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    Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00837
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    1. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
    2. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2007. "Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 307-325, August.
    3. Shigehiro Serizawa, 1999. "Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 121-146, January.
    4. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 1997. "Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1215-1220, September.
    5. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
    6. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
    7. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2009. "The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 256-264, September.
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