Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
For economies with one private good and one public good, the author discusses social choice functions satisfying the following requirements: strategy-proofness--representing true preferences is a dominant strategy; symmetry--two agents having the same preference pay equal cost shares--anonymity--when agents' preferences are switched, so are their consumption bundles; and individual rationality--allocations making agents worse off than their initial situations are never obtained. Theorem 1 characterizes strategy-proof, budget-balancing, and symmetric social choice functions under convex public good technology. Theorems 2 and 3 characterize such functions without the convexity assumption, but employ anonymity and individual rationality requirements respectively.
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Volume (Year): 67 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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