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Strategy-proof Sharing

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Listed:
  • Hideki Mizukami
  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo
  • Takuma Wakayama

Abstract

We consider the problem of sharing a good, where agents prefer more to less. In this environment, we prove that a sharing rule satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it has the quasi-constancy property:no one changes her own share by changing her announcements. Next,by constructing a system of linear equations, we provide a way to find every strategy-proof sharing rule, and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a non-constant, strategy-proof sharing rule. Finally, we show that it is only the equal-sharing rule that satisfies strategy-proofness and symmetry.

Suggested Citation

  • Hideki Mizukami & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takuma Wakayama, 2003. "Strategy-proof Sharing," Discussion papers 03017, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:03017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
    2. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
    3. Miki Kato & Shinji Ohseto, 2002. "Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 659-664.
    4. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
    5. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    6. Mizukami, Hideki & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Wakayama, Takuma, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Sharing," Working Papers 1170, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    7. Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    8. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
    9. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    10. Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2007. "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
    11. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 587-597.
    12. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    13. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bevia, Carmen & Corchon, Luis, 1995. "On the Generic Impossibility of Truthful Behavior: A Simple Approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 365-371, July.
    2. Mizukami, Hideki & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Wakayama, Takuma, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Sharing," Working Papers 1170, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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