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Social Choice: Recent Developments

  • BOSSERT, Walter
  • WEYMARK, J.A.

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.

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Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 01-2006.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2006
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  2. Bordes, Georges & Campbell, Donald E & Le Breton, Michel, 1995. "Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 441-54, May.
  3. Barbera, Salvador, 1983. "Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 413-17, June.
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  19. John A. Weymark, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0409, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
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  25. Bailey, Martin J, 1979. "The Possibility of Rational Social Choice in an Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 37-56, February.
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  27. Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  28. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Discussion Papers 1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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