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Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains

Listed author(s):
  • Michel Le Breton

    ()

    (GREMAQ and IDEI, Universite de Toulouse 1)

  • John A. Weymark

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu02-w06R.pdf
File Function: Revised version, 2003
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0206.

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Date of creation: Apr 2002
Date of revision: Sep 2003
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0206
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Yanovskaya, Elena B., 1994. "Correspondence between social choice functions and solutions of cooperative games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 217-234, April.
  2. Weymark, John A., 1998. "Welfarism on economic domains1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 251-268, December.
  3. Ehud Kalai & Zvi Ritz, 1978. "Characterization of the Private Alternative Domains Admitting Arrow Social Welfare Functions," Discussion Papers 341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. John Bone, 2003. "Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(1), pages 41-48.
  5. Gaertner,Wulf, 2001. "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521791021, December.
  6. Le Breton, Michel & Trannoy, Alain, 1987. "Measures of inequality as an aggregation of individual preferences about income distribution: The arrowian case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 248-269, April.
  7. Kannai, Yakar, 1974. "Approximation of convex preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 101-106, August.
  8. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1976. "On Linear and Lexicographic Orders, Majority Rule and Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(1), pages 213-219, February.
  9. EHLERS, Lars & WEYMARK, John A., 2001. "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Cahiers de recherche 2001-30, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  10. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2002. "Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 35-94 Elsevier.
  11. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Social choice with analytic preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 637-657.
  12. James Redekop, 1996. "Arrow theorems in mixed goods, stochastic, and dynamic economic environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 95-112, January.
  13. Kannai, Yakar, 1970. "Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 791-815, November.
  14. David M. Grether & Charles R. Plott, 1982. "Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 143-149.
  15. Bordes, Georges & Campbell, Donald E & Le Breton, Michel, 1995. "Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 441-454, May.
  16. DUTTA, Bhaskar & JACKSON, Matthew O. & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "Strategic candidacy and voting procedures," CORE Discussion Papers 1999011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Peters, Hans & Wakker, Peter, 1991. "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1787-1801, November.
  18. Kim Border, 1984. "An impossibility theorem for spatial models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 293-305, January.
  19. Campbell, Donald E., 1993. "Euclidean individual preference and continuous social preference," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 541-550, November.
  20. Campbell, Donald E, 1992. "Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 341-352, May.
  21. Redekop, James, 1993. "The questionnaire topology on some spaces of economic preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 479-494.
  22. Campbell, Donald E., 1992. "Quasitransitive intergenerational choice for economic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 229-247.
  23. Jeffrey Richelson, 1984. "Social choice and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 225-234, January.
  24. Donaldson, David & Weymark, John A., 1988. "Social choice in economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 291-308, December.
  25. Campbell, Donald E., 1990. "Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 414-423, April.
  26. Ehlers,Lars & Storcken,Ton, 2001. "Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments," Research Memorandum 006, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  27. Campbell, Donald E., 1992. "The arrow and plott independence conditions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 143-146, June.
  28. Kim C. Border & J. S. Jordan, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 153-170.
  29. Bordes, Georges & Breton, Michel Le, 1989. "Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 257-281, April.
  30. Saari, Donald G., 1991. "Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 271-306.
  31. Georges Bordes & Peter J. Hammond & Michel Le Breton, 2005. "Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, 02.
  32. Ehlers, Lars, 2001. "Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 239-250, March.
  33. Bailey, Martin J, 1979. "The Possibility of Rational Social Choice in an Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 37-56, February.
  34. Redekop, James, 1991. "Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 396-427, April.
  35. Campbell, Donald E, 1992. "Implementation of Social Welfare Functions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(3), pages 525-533, August.
  36. Border, Kim C., 1983. "Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the pareto principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 205-216, April.
  37. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller & Mark Satterthwaite, 1979. "Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 87-97, March.
  38. Inada, Ken-ichi, 1971. "Social Welfare Function and Social Indifference Surfaces," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(3), pages 599-624, May.
  39. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  40. Campbell, Donald E., 1990. "Can equity be purchased at the expense of efficiency? An axiomatic inquiry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 32-47, June.
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