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Oligarchies in spatial environments

Author

Listed:
  • Ehlers, L.H.

    (Externe publicaties SBE)

  • Storcken, A.J.A.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

In spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives according to the Lp-norm (for a fixed p => 1). When the policy space is multi-dimensional and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex, any quasi-transitive welfare function must be oligarchic. As a corollary we obtain that for transitive welfare functions weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ehlers, L.H. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2007. "Oligarchies in spatial environments," Research Memorandum 042, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007042
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2007042
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    Cited by:

    1. Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2008. "Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 533-547, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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