Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice
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- Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark, 2003. "Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 233-243, September.
- John A. Weymark, 2000. "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0029, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Feb 2001.
- Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark, 2001. "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0113, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Grether, David M. & Plott, Charles R., "undated". "Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem," Working Papers 271, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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- Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001.
"Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-1037, July.
- DUTTA, Bhaskar & JACKSON, Matthew O. & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "Strategic candidacy and voting procedures," CORE Discussion Papers 1999011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
- Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Ehlers,Lars & Storcken,Ton, 2001.
"Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments,"
Research Memorandum
006, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton, 2002. "Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments," Cahiers de recherche 2002-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Bejan, Camelia, 2011.
"No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1995-2012, September.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Camelia Bejan, 2009. "No Profitable Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems," Working Papers 2009-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 2002.
"Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains,"
IDEI Working Papers
143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.
- Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0206, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2003.
- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2006.
"Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 545-570, December.
- Carmelo Rodr?uez-?varez, 2001. "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 492.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo, 2003. "Candidate Stability And Voting Correspondences," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 666, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Samejima, Yusuke, 2005. "Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 190-195, August.
- Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2008. "Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 533-547, November.
- Priscilla Man & Shino Takayama, 2013.
"A unifying impossibility theorem,"
Economic Theory,
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 249-271, October.
- Priscilla Man & Shino Takayama, 2012. "A Unifying Impossibility Theorem," Discussion Papers Series 448, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Akifumi Ishihara & Shintaro Miura, 2017. "Minor candidates as kingmakers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 253-263, March.
- Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 152-175, September.
More about this item
Keywords
axiomatic social choice; candidate stability; litical economy; voting;JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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