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Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice

Author

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  • John A. Weymark

    () (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

A voting procedure is candidate stable if no candidate would prefer to withdraw from an election when all of the other potential candidates enter. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton have recently established a number of theorems showing that candidate stability is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide a simple proof of Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton's impossibility theorem for the case in which the voters and potential candidates have no one in common.

Suggested Citation

  • John A. Weymark, 2000. "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0029, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Feb 2001.
  • Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0029
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu00-w29R.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David M. Grether & Charles R. Plott, 1982. "Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 143-149.
    2. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-1037, July.
    4. Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
    5. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Bejan, Camelia, 2011. "No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1995-2012, September.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers 143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.
    3. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2006. "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 545-570, December.
    4. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Samejima, Yusuke, 2005. "Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 190-195, August.
    6. Priscilla Man & Shino Takayama, 2013. "A unifying impossibility theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 249-271, October.
    7. Ehlers,Lars & Storcken,Ton, 2001. "Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments," Research Memorandum 006, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    8. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    9. Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
    10. Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2008. "Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 533-547, November.
    11. Akifumi Ishihara & Shintaro Miura, 2017. "Minor candidates as kingmakers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 253-263, March.
    12. Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 152-175, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Axiomatic social choice; candidate stability; political economy; voting;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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